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Editorial

Venezuela: Socialist Tide (Marea Socialista) activists on the

Autor: Federico Fuentes. International Journal of Socialist Renewal
24 de Marzo de 2008

---

Federico Fuentes, part of the Green Left Weekly/Links Caracas bureau,
spoke to two of the key leaders of Socialist Tide (Marea Socialista),
asking them their opinions on the PSUV and its founding congress,
particularly in light of the defeat of the December 2, 2007,
referendum on Chavez's proposed constitutional reform.

During the first week of February 2008, he spoke to Gonzalo Gómez and
Stalin Perez Borges. Gomez is a delegate to the founding congress from
the well-organised area of Catia in Caracas, a journalist and
co-founder of the Revolutionary Popular Assembly (Aporrea), which was
formed in the wake of the April 2002 coup. It brought together a large
number of the social and community organisations in Caracas to
organise in defence of the revolution, and whose website is the most
read website of news and analysis on the Bolivarian Revolution.

Stalin Perez Borges is a national coordinator of the UNT and a key
union leader in the state of Carabobo, the private industrial
heartland of Venezuela.

Following the completion of the congress Links will publish interviews
with a number of delegates and revolutionary activists in the PSUV to
get their views on what occurred.

***

Over the weekend February 29-March 2, the provisionally named United
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) held the last general assembly of
its founding congress. The 1671 delegates, who since January 12 have
been meeting each week to discuss and debate the key documents of the
new party, will vote on the party's declaration of principles, program
and statutes. The following week, the elected spokespeople and heads
of commissions from the more than 14,000 socialist battalions (the
local grassroots unit of the new party) voted for the provisional
leadership of the party.

Since Chavez's call on December 15, 2006, to launch a new party of the
revolution -- a political instrument at the service of the social
movements and the revolution - many previously existing revolutionary
groups have joined the PSUV fighting to ensure it truly becomes a mass
revolutionary party. Amongst those are the militants now organised
around the newspaper Socialist Tide.

Many of the key leaders of Socialist Tide have been decades-long
militants in the Trotskyist movement in Venezuela. Coming from a range
of different organisations such as the Socialist Party of Workers
(Partido Socialista de Trabajadores), The Spark (La Chispa) and
others. During Hugo Chavez's first presidential campaign in 1998, the
Trotskyist movement in Venezuela split over support for his
candidature. Over the next few years, many of these militants went on
to form the Option of the Revolution Left (Opcion de la Izquierda
Revolucionario) and consolidate an important base in trade union
movement.

Some of them played key roles in the defeat of the bosses' lockout in
December 2002-January 2003, organising amongst the oil workers, and
afterwards in the creation of the revolutionary trade union
federation, the National Union of Workers (UNT), which quickly
replaced the rotting carcass of the corrupt Confederation of
Venezuelan Workers (CTV). With the formation of the UNT, a number of
national and regional UNT coordinators, involving many of the current
militants of Socialist Tide, went on to form the Classist, Unitary,
Revolutionary and Autonomous Current (CCURA), today arguably the
largest current within the UNT.

In 2005, a number of these union leaders and social movement activists
launched the Revolution and Socialism Party (Partido Revolucion y
Socialismo, PRS) as an attempt at creating a ``independent workers'
party''.

With Chavez's announcement of the formation of the new party, the PRS
underwent a split with the majority of the party, and in particular
its union base decided to join the new party. CCURA also
overwhelmingly voted to go into the new party, as did all the other
major union currents in the UNT.

***

Federico Fuentes: What were the reasons behind the defeat of President
Chavez's constitutional reforms in the December 2 referendum?

Stalin Perez Borges: There were many factors, there was no single
cause. The principal one was the situation of the government not
resolving the fundamental problems in society, the bureaucratic
actions and corruption that exist in the institutions of the state.
This affected hundreds of thousands of militants, the people for the
barrios [poor neighbourhoods] who have defended the process, who have
risked their lives. So for this sector, when the bureaucracy grows and
the problems are not solved, the people do not feel any incentive,
they do not feel enthusiastic about accompanying the process of
change.

Along with this the [opposition] campaign, a terrible, diabolic
campaign of fear, of scaring people, was dominant; that also
influenced people. We still have hundreds of thousands of people who
have repeatedly voted for Chavez, but whose consciousness is a not
fully class conscious, and who believed it when they were told that
their houses were going to taken away from them.

I personally had an experience with someone who works at a newspaper
stand here at the entrance of the La Paz metro station, I used this
example in a number of speeches I gave during the campaign. One day
there was a headline on El Mundo and I made a comment about it and he
said that, yes the people were very angry because the Chavez
government was going to taking their property away from them, that the
government was going to interfere in their ability to drink whisky. So
the problem there was that this person was lacking consciousness; he
was going to benefit from the reforms but the campaign had convinced
him that he was going to be negatively affected by the reforms because
``they were going to take away'' his property, even though he didn't
own an type of property.

So these factors influenced the result: the incapacity to resolve
problems, the growth of the bureaucracy and the propaganda of the
right. Those three, and other factors as well.

Gonzalo Gómez: I believe that that there were diverse causes; that any
analysis is complex. But, taking into consideration the debates that
have unfolded in Aporrea between different writers, the discussions
that have occurred in the battalions [local units] of the PSUV and
amongst the popular organisations, and my own reflections, I think
that one of the causes was the manner in which the reform was
proposed. It was very rushed, very much done on the run, without
giving the organisations, the movements and ordinary people time to
assimilate it. There weren't sufficient opportunities to incorporate
contributions from the workers, peasant and popular movements.

It is true that there were events held as part of the
``parliamentarism of the street'', and there were a few modifications
made, but it was not an organic, systematised process. Who was
responsible for whether proposals from the movement were accepted or
not? Who determined this? Who decided it? It was not an orderly
consultation.

It was certainly much more democratic than anything else we have seen
in this country in the past, before we had this revolution. Yes, the
revolution has widened the framework of participation, but this
participation is yet to be channelled in the manner it should be.

So the National Assembly continued to decide on its own what should go
in the reform, and President Chavez made his own decisions over what
went in and what stayed out. This led to a situation where there
wasn't sufficient [popular] identification with the proposals.

Of course, despite this we supported the reform -- we fought for a Yes
vote -- but we also brought along with us many concerns, worries;
there were observations, criticisms against some elements, some
aspects which could have been improved considerably.

This was the democratic, or methodological, problem; there was also
the problem of timing, of the moment chosen, given that the United
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) as such had still not been
constituted; the programmatic discussion hadn't yet unfolded. What was
our reference point for pushing forward with the reform? Was the
reform going to determine the principles and program of the party,
should the principles and the program of the party guide us in our
proposals regarding the necessary reforms to the state? The cart was
put before the horse; the process was inverse, the reverse of what it
should have been.

It would have been preferable to wait, because the discussion that was
unfolding in the PSUV was halted and it was necessary to dedicate
ourselves to the reform campaign and the referendum, as I said before,
in a rushed manner. This led to a situation where there wasn't the
necessary consistency and where the PSUV was not able to create its
own electoral apparatus to confront this challenge.

There were some who used this to say that it was necessary to go back
to the previous structure of the MVR [Movement of the Fifth Republic],
because that was an electoral machine. Despite all this, [the PSUV]
worked quite well, [even though] the PSUV had never [before]
intervened in elections.

I believe that the other fundamental problem that has to be taken into
consideration is that the government did not adequately confront the
campaign run by the oligarchy, by the bourgeoisie. It let itself be
cornered in regards to many aspects because it did not take the
opportune measures, for example measures that are now being adopted in
relation to food shortages, the speculation of food. The lack of milk
and other products had been impacting negatively on the people for
some time and the government did not implement any measures, took no
action, and the people began to ask ``Why the hell do I want the
reform?'', ``What reform are they talking about if I don't even have
milk to give to my child''. Moreover, the right-wing took this up as
one of their slogans, they utilised this situation to manipulate
popular sentiment.

Similarly, there were other situations that led to sectors of the mass
movement refusing to vote or demonstrating their discontent, their
lack of enthusiasm with government policies. For example, take the
workers' movement. They can be offering you the six hour day - which
is a grand conquest - but if at the same time they are not discussing
your collective contracts; they keep you on individual contracts,
labour casualisation-style, with neoliberal-type employment relations,
including in the public sector, where ministers have workers in
precarious conditions; they don't respect union rights; there are
experiences and situations of workers' control and occupied factories
and the same state functionaries come and seek to give back the
factory to the boss and pay workers their redundancy, even financing
the business owners.

Are these functionaries being guide by a principle that points towards
deepening the revolution and pushing forward the transition towards
socialism? Are they trying to favour and support social production and
collective forms of property? No! They are there doing business, who
knows what, trying to make sure that the bourgeoisie is not bothered;
they have an interest in pleasing sectors of the bourgeoisie or the
most conservative sectors of the middle class so that they do not
become irritated.

There they leave the people to the side, the Chavista people, those
who could be willing to wholeheartedly support the president. These
are some of the examples that one could give as to why the people did
not go to vote en masse in support of the government and the
president's proposals as they had before.

It has to do with the issue of how to resolve problems. Take the
example of the informal economy, that encompasses some 48% or 49% of
the labouring masses ... it is true that there are distortions in the
informal economy, there are individuals who own many stalls and charge
others to manage them and attend to the stalls. In reality some of
them are capitalists or are parts of the roscas and mafias linked to
narcotrafficking, there are sectors that are even linked to hired
assassins... But the government has not had a policy to combat this,
appealing to the democratic organisation of the buhoneros (street
vendors), taking into consideration their concerns and seeking out
opportune solutions, instead, when the situation gets to an extreme,
where they are affecting the right to a clean city, the right to
health and the ability circulate through the streets, it reaches a
point where they come into contradiction with the rest of the
citizens. Then the local mayor steps in and resolves the problem by
evicting the buhoneros, removing them from their areas using the
police.

OK, one part of the population applauds this as an alleviation of the
problem, but the other part of the population, who have children to
feed, who have a family, have no jobs, etc., is left feeling
resentful, attacked, and this leads to a loss of votes for the
government.

This is not the way to resolve problems. The way to resolve them is
through democratic discussion, attacking the capitalist and corrupt
elements that exist within this sector, fighting for leadership,
opening up alternatives in the social economy for these sectors,
seeking jobs for them, and not having to end up opting to negatively
affect their interests and earning the antipathy of a sector of the
population who were part of our voting base, or which continues to be,
but which does not manifest itself. Therefore, many of them abstained
in the referendum; they didn't participate as they had at other times.

All these things really have to be taken into consideration, because
what most affected us is the fact that we are not applying the
measures that the actual revolution puts on the table, and which the
government offers but afterwards does not follow through with in
action. Measures [are] announced, [but] they stop halfway. This leads
to a deterioration of the situation.

What is your opinion of the actions and statements of the government
following December 2, for example the cabinet changes, the seeking
alliances with the national bourgeoisie, etc.?

Borges: I don't believe that President Chavez is correct when he said
that the people did not have the capacity to take up the changes he
proposed. There were some important changes, but I also don't believe
that, with the changes that were being proposed, we were going to go
directly to socialism. There were small advances; the social and
popular movements would have been able to assume greater initiative
and power, but it was a lie that we were going to socialism.

Moreover, President Chavez has been talking about socialism for two or
three years -- he was elected president campaigning for socialism --
so it wasn't a fear of socialism, it was an expression of anger
against the bureaucracy, against talking about socialism but not
resolving problems. For the people, whose political consciousness has
been growing, socialism is where there will not be a few people who
grossly enrich themselves, where there will not be bureaucracy, where
things will be shared by all, where it is possible to resolve problems
regarding food given that there is so much land in this country. So I
would say that it is wrong to say that because they were not socialist
they did not vote for the reform.

For me, I am not so worried about the result: I thought that defeat,
as we always say, borrowing a phrase from Trotsky, would serve as a
whip -- the whip of the counterrevolution - that it would serve the
revolution, but I'm are not sure it will be like that.

Parting from the assessment that he took out of the referendum, that
the people were not prepared, we have seen a process of rectification,
which has left in place the majority of the ministers, and where the
majority of the changes signified little change at all. This cannot
lead to the serious rectification that is needed.

I think that the three R's [revision, rectification and relaunch] are
a necessity, but it needs to be a serious effort towards
rectification. Who's going to carry out this rectification, the same
people who have made the mistakes? Meanwhile, the people have no say
in making these decisions. There will be no improvements if it is done
in this manner. So what most worries me is not the defeat, but rather
the changes that have been announced and the assessment of the defeat,
the new ministers.

The people are also unhappy about this. I spend most of my time in the
workers' sector, the trade union sector, and by leaving the same
minister of labour who we have denounced 20,000 times, because the
minister, who comes from one of the union currents within the UNT
[National Union of Workers] that has wanted to position itself as a
supposed majority within the unions, has carried out actions of
favouritism, attacking all the other currents, including many times in
collaboration with business owners; that is not the way to build a
real union movement with revolutionary class consciousness.
Progressive things such as labour solvency have been thrown in the
bin; many of the functionaries in the ministry are more interested in
doing business.

If there is not a real change, there is a big risk than we could face
another defeat and lose the process. I'm optimistic in the sense that
I know that this process has created hundreds of thousands of people
who today want change, but we have a problem of leadership, as well as
of the apparatus that has been kidnapped; if we do not get rid of that
bureaucracy in the state apparatus and institutions, I'm not sure what
will happen to those people who want change.

Gómez: It seems to me that now that the three R's have been proposed,
all this has to be done. But my question is: who is going to revise,
rectify and relaunch? Is that for the cabinet and President Chavez to
do on their own, separately, or is it something that needs to be done
involving closely the social and popular movements to see what type of
revision is carried out?

Because, if not, President Chavez can reflect with the Minister of
Labour about labour policies and policies towards the workers'
movement...aha! But why not involve all the currents of the National
Union of Workers (UNT)? President Chavez has said that he is annoyed
by the division, the fragmentation of the workers' movement into
different currents, that's ok, but you can't solve this problem by
opting for one of the currents, which moreover, is a minority current,
or by cosying up to one of the sectors that is not exactly the most
free of bureaucrats.

Why not create a consultative body involving the social movements and
the president of the republic, and the government, where proposals and
policies are placed under consideration so that all of us can
intervene in their design, their elaboration? That is popular power.

Popular power cannot remain solely at the local level -- communal
councils that resolve the problems of so many streets, so many blocks.
It also has to involve the big national organisations that the
Venezuelan people have at hand, with all there defects, no more than
the defects that the government has. It is fundamental that we are
able to intervene in leading the country. So, if we are going to
revise, if we are going to rectify and if we are going to relaunch,
let's do it together with the grand social organisations, with the
organised workers' movement, with the peasants, with the organs of
popular power. Let's summon all of them to sit down at the table,
instead of putting things in terms of ``dialogue'' with the
bourgeoisie, of meeting with business sectors, with the Church, which
is something we are beginning to see an inclination towards.

In that regard, I don't think they have the best reading of the
situation: it is not that the people were not mature enough; it's that
the political leadership did not know how to do it. Through the
process of struggle, in the dynamic of the struggle, it is the people
setting the standard. Take the example I put to you before, of
workers' control: if the workers are occupying factories and putting
them under workers' control, the workers are more mature than many
government functionaries who, instead of supporting this initiative,
backing it so that it comes out in front, so that it is strengthened,
so that it is extended, they sit down with the bosses to see how they
can give them back their factories. So, who is mature? Many of the
functionaries of the state are the ones who suffer from a lack of
maturity; there are sectors of the people who know much better what
they have to do, what is necessary to make a revolution...

We do not need a dialogue which is fundamentally with sections of the
opposition; I am not against dialogue, but the first dialogue has to
be with the people ... to see how we should deal with the problems,
with different situations and [resolve] conflicts in our favour, and
not to give concessions to sectors that are seeking to utilise any
weakness in the process to finish off everything we have achieved, and
finish off the government and President Chavez.

I think that this is fundamental: what is needed here is for popular
power to go beyond the local sphere..... There are social organisations
in this country that are being ignored, there are peasant movements
with a national scope such as the National Peasant Front Ezequiel
Zamora, there is the National Agrarian Coalition, there is the
National Workers Union, divided, but well... call all the currents, sit
down with all of them, rather than telling them off because they are
divided; sit them down, all of them and see what is put forward, let
them intervene and discuss, along with other sectors of the popular
movement.

I believe that in any case, the objective situation is obliging the
government to once again take a confrontational stance, because the
bourgeoisie, with the continuation of this sabotage of the food
security of the people, with their contraband, their hoarding ... are
obliging the government to have to take harsher measures. The
government wants dialogue with the bourgeoisie, and at the same time
the bourgeoisie sabotages the distribution of food, so the government
is obliged to radicalise: they detain trucks, confiscate hoarded food,
raid factory sheds where milk, rice, coffee are being hoarded. Aha!
But what other measures need to be taken? Are we going to continue to
live with problem? With the National Guard having to chase the trucks
of business owners trying to smuggle food over the border to Colombia?
Or are we going to take other measures?

On one hand, the government is trying to develop national state food
production, which should involve social participation in its control
and management. But on the other hand it will also be necessary to
expropriate some capitalists, to control the foreign trade of basic
food produce.

Didn't we want to prohibit monopolies in the reform? Well, which are
the monopolies in the food sector, in the production, processing,
distribution and commercialisation of food? Do monopolies exist in
this sector or not? What is Polar [the largest food distributor in
Venezuela]? Should we touch their interests or not? And we do not need
to reform the constitution to do this: the 1999 constitution already
takes up the issue of monopolies in some form and there is the legal
backing, and moreover there exists the element of mobilisation and
struggle.

More decisiveness is required. The bourgeoisie itself is presenting us
with an opportunity, and therefore measures should be taken with the
support of the people. The people will, as we say here, ``jump on one
leg'' and will vigorously demonstrate their willing to back President
Chavez in any new electoral contest. But if this does not occur, we
could continue to go backwards, or we could suffer new defeats,
because if the revolution does not continue resolving problems, and
therefore begins to go backwards or comes to halt, it will mean that
capitalism will continue to destroy us and continue to destroy the
conquests of the revolution.

In this context, what is the importance of this founding congress of the PSUV?

Gómez: Well, the importance of the congress is that it is a step
towards structuring a political force closely tied to this
revolutionary process, renovating it, allowing the coming together of
different tendencies, currents and sectors within the revolutionary
process that were not all contained in the previous political
formations, that were not just the MVR or PPT [Homeland For All]; it
includes many sectors of the left that have been working in the social
movements. To have this space, this unitary framework is a grand
conquest.

A second conquest is that we have a process with valuable democratic
spaces, although with methodological vices, with problems, with
difficulties, with threats, but in general terms the people are
discussing in the grassroots. The fact that we are discussing the
principles, the program, the statutes of the party, that we can put
forward positions regarding the manner in which to elect our
leadership and candidates for the next electoral processes, all this
is very important.

And the internal debate, in and of itself, is something very rich and
very positive; the process itself, more than the specific results that
it may have in the immediate term, because this party has to intervene
in the class struggle.

That said, there are some things that we consider to be weaknesses: it
would have been very important to have had a greater presence of the
organised workers' movement. The weight of the organised working class
has been diluted by the initial territorial-based formula chosen for
the construction of the party, where the social fronts where never
established. These two things should have been combined because one
finds at the congress that there is a lack of presence of the
organised working class, of workers. The composition is essentially
popular-communitarian, with some elements of the peasant movement and
the organised working class.

We need to workerise the PSUV, insert the working class into the PSUV,
because otherwise there will not be a sufficient counterweight to
those sectors, that do exist, who have committed acts of corruption,
who have bureaucratic practises, who we know have accumulated wealth,
who aspire to be capitalists or who are already part of the
bourgeoisie, who do not aspire to be part of a socialist economy but
rather to enrich themselves, to have their own property, exploiting
workers. We do not want to build a party with people like that. They
are passing over to the side of the class enemy and this is something
that needs to be resolved. But this will not be simply be resolved
with a congress.

Borges: Everything that I have said to you -- about the possibility of
rectifying, and the grassroots imposing themselves on the institutions
and the apparatus so that changes occur - almost 80% of this passes
through the PSUV, and what it could end up being. The PSUV has created
great expectations for the millions of people who have expressed their
will to belong to the party. Those aspirants who have become active in
their battalions, constituting a vanguard ... intend to make real
changes and know what has to be done.

But if that does not become a reality -- in the form of a good
program; punishing the corrupt ones and making sure they are not able
to continue to act with complete impunity; where unlike the past when
the government told the party what to do rather than the party
becoming an instrument of the social movements and the grassroots of
Chavismo to democratically define policies and decide the candidates
to stand for elections for public posts -- it will be a failure.

What are the fundamental points that need to be dealt with at this congress?

Borges: The whole future of the revolution should be dealt with at the
PSUV congress! Though, I don't know if they will be able to do this.
Nevertheless, the necessary issue is the birth of the party. Many of
those that are part of the Technical Commission, who are directing the
construction of the party, and many government functionaries are not
too worried about what type of program, what type of declaration of
principles the party will have. Instead, they see the need for this
organisation purely so that they can begin their electoral campaigns.
Of course, we need the party [to contest the elections], working
together with the other parties of the Patriotic Pole [pro-revolution
parties outside the PSUV], and the social movements -- because the
challenge of the elections for governors and mayors cannot be left
only to the parties - they have to link up with the popular movement
and the small parties from the left, beyond just the PPT and PCV
[Communist Party of Venezuela].

I believe that the party needs to discuss how we can build a truly
socialist economy, because today we continue to live in capitalism.
How do we truly build socialism?

Another issue that cannot be simply seen as of secondary importance is
the role that Venezuela plays in Latin America, serving as an example,
a reference point for other countries to begin to take the path
towards a democratic, revolutionary socialism, with Venezuela leading
the way. Why is this important? Because no matter how much force and
resources Venezuela may have, no matter how much force there is in the
grassroots, wanting to advance towards socialism, we all know that
capitalism is a global system and that is it a lie that Venezuela can
defeat it on its own. To be able to defeat capitalism and build
socialism in a few countries, it is also necessary to count on the
capacity to extend the revolution to other countries, because
otherwise that experience will go backwards. So alongside discussing
how to advance the revolution in Venezuela, we need to begin to
elaborate ideas about how we can help construct a continental
revolution.

The party needs to discuss what democratic methods it will use so as
to not exclude anyone from the discussion and from participation: to
ensure that criticism is not sanctioned as is the custom, believing
that democratic centralism and discipline means excluding criticism
regarding how different people see the process. We need to guarantee
that in a democratic manner all these discussions and different
opinions come together in a big melting pot, where the possibilities
exist to enrich proposals, creating the real possibility that everyone
will feel like it belongs to them.

The party also has to be the most important watchdog, keeping a close
watch on state functionaries, governors, mayors, ministers etc., in
order to put an end to the two scourges that are dealing enormous
blows against the revolutionary process: corruption and bureaucracy.

The party has to be capable of at least doing four things:
implementing an agro-industrial program for development that tackles
the problems of unemployment, provides dignified wages, contributes to
an end to crime -- which is a very grave problem-- and that
contributes to providing resources to guarantee dignified social
security; helping promote the continental revolution; creating
democratic structures that are open to all types of debates and
criticisms; and closely monitoring state institutions in order to
tackle the problems of corruption and bureaucratism.

Gómez: One of the fundamental points [which] has not been dealt with
in a fully satisfactory manner, is the method of functioning of the
congress. [The functioning of the congress is being overseen by] a
nominated Presidential Commission and Technical Commission, and now
the Support Commission. From these emanate the guidelines for the
congress. While the PSUV has been adopting a structure of battalions
[local grassroots part units], circumscripcions [party electoral
districts that unite eight to 12 local battalions], of spokespeople,
of delegates etc, these commissions are not made up of delegates. They
should have been transferring the direction and control of the
congress - and of the process of construction of the party - to the
main body of delegates, without that implying the marginalisation of
the members of commissions, ... but who now [should] integrate
themselves with the delegates.

They should discuss with the delegates in order to take account their
points of view, the concerns they have over how things are proceeding,
above all else to synchronise the discussion of the congress with the
discussions in the battalions, in the circumscripcions.

What is occurring is that we have been, in a rushed manner, discussing
documents that have not been discussed by the grassroots and it is not
clear what mechanisms exist to give these documents their final form,
so that the definitive formulation truly emerges from the grassroots
... so we can vote on something that has truly emerged from the
grassroots discussion.

In my opinion, the problem began before the congress. We should have
convoked a period of pre-congress discussion of some three months; of
course, the constitutional reform was thrust on us in the middle and
it ate up what could have been a pre-congress period. During this
period, discussion of the documents could have unfolded, giving time
to elaborate and present other documents.

If someone wants to present a document, how do they do it? How do they
distribute it at the national level? How do they ensure that it gets
to everyone [for discussion]? Is it only the documents that come from
the Support Commission that can be distributed at this scale or can
other contributions emerge? So, there are some important details that
it is necessary to solve during the course of the congress.

Some of the organisational questions in the congress have been
improving, things are functioning a bit better, but undoubtedly,
before dealing with the next issue or session, there has to be a
discussion of the methodology -- which is what the delegates from
Caracas proposed -- so that we can adjust this methodology and that
the congress can have a presiding commission made up of delegates,
together with members of the Support Commission, but one that is
elected and designated by the congress itself.

Because, if you find yourself reporting back from one of the
discussion tables, standing on the stage, and there is no an adequate
control of the congress session, where there isn't adequate
[chairing], minutes are not being taken of the plenary, nor are things
being put to a vote if there is a proposal to be voted on; all these
affect democracy, the principle of participatory, grassroots
democracy... There continues to be a grand democratic participation,
never seen before, but it needs to fine-tuned, because organisational
difficulties continue to exist that affect the full exercise of
democracy.

Moreover a request to discuss the role of the regional liaison
delegate [who were elected the day before the congress began, on the
basis of one from each state] by discussion table* 11 and conveyed to
congress floor by myself as the spokesperson of this table was put to
a vote during the plenary session at Charallave [in the state of
Miranda, where the first general assembly of the congress was held
over the weekend of January 19-20] and approved by a great majority.
However, it seems that this vote was ignored by the [Support
Commission].

[*As well as having plenary discussions, the 1671 delegates at the
congress were organised into 50 mesas de discusion (discussion tables)
or mesas de trabajo (work tables), in which they debated the program,
principles and statutes of the party and then reported back to the
congress on their deliberations.]

Another thing is that there are some prerequisites [required] in order
to be able to do things. For example, a programmatic document can't be
discussed without having previously having clearly approved and
established [political] principles... Moreover, it is necessary to
have a discussion about the political conjuncture, or the
social-historical context, an evaluation of the revolutionary process
and the characterisation of the Venezuelan revolution -- what type of
revolution we have. How are we going to identify the problems that we
have to resolve, and how are we going to formulate slogans, if we do
not have an analysis of the context we are in?

You cannot just take a document that has been handed to you and begin
to look it over, make criticisms and evaluate it. What reality do you
take as your point of reference? What each person has in their mind or
something that is contained in a document that we can approve, that we
can amend, that we can add to, or where we can present alternative
document? This has not been resolved; it is a very important issue.

It would be good for the congress to discuss immediate responses to
issues that are emerging in the current context. For example, it is
very important to issue a pronouncement backing the policy of
President Chavez's humanitarian mediation in the internal conflict in
Colombia, and in support of the president in the face of the offensive
that imperialism has launched to discredit him, of putting President
Chavez in the terrorist camp, things like that. This is a very
delicate situation. We have to issue a firm pronouncement backing the
president and the government, and the policy of denouncing Plan
Colombia.

Another is giving our support to firm, energetic measures that are
being taken, or that could be taken, by the government in regards to
the issue of hoarding and contraband, the sabotage of the distribution
of food, but also proposing social control by communities, together
with the social organisations, the workers in the food sector, the
organs of popular power, the communal councils, to carry out the task
of inspections, of social intelligence. Where the government takes
measures, that we [should propose] to carry out a grand mobilisation
in support of measures against the monopolies and financial empires of
production, distribution and commercialisation of food, as is the case
with Polar, already implicated in other the petroleum sabotage [of
December 2002-January 2003]. We have to take measures such as
expropriation under the control of the workers and the communities,
and hand them over to the state, because they are acting against food
sovereignty and the security and health of the population, which is a
fundamental right.

Another thing that we should take a position on has to do with
opposing moves by those who are attempting to benefit from the amnesty
[decreed by Chavez for some of those involved in the April 2002 coup
attempt] who were involved in violations of human rights and in crimes
against humanity. This is the case of those found responsible for the
acts of April 11, members of the Metropolitan Police and the
ex-commissioners of [Caracas Mayor Alfredo] Peña, who assassinated
dozens of people in Baralt Avenue and Puente Llaguno, utilising the
arms and vehicles of the police of the ex-mayor Peña, a fascist
mayor...

Meanwhile the victims of the coup need more solidarity, and greater
support, so that those responsible for the assassination of their
relatives, or those that injured them, are not let off the hook as if
nothing had happened, because here we are dealing with a threat for
the rest of the social, popular organisations that fought on April 11
against the coup. This is a very important point.

As well, as this, we need to supporting the proposal of the president
for a referendum, which could include a recall referendum on the
president - in which we would be obviously in favour of keeping the
president, of ratifying the government - but where we would once again
have the opportunity to allow President Chavez to be re-elected in
order to maintain the impulse of the revolutionary process, with the
leadership that is at its head. I do not see another candidate
emerging from within Chavismo for the next period that is not
President Chavez. There are many sectors that have pretensions, who
are to the right of the president. There is no figure that could
impose themselves from the left, and the social, popular movements
etc. have to back the re-election of Chavez. No other leadership has
emerged from the social movements that is sufficiently strong enough
to be able to relieve the president from his position as head of the
government..., that has to mature, develop.

Of course, President Chavez has to work together with the social and
popular movements, to ensure a very tight and very strong alliance, to
ensure that this bond is not broken, and from there comply with a
series of tasks so that the people are satisfied, so that they see a
determination to continue deepening the revolution.

Within this framework, the social movements, the popular movement,
needs to take up elements of the constitutional reform in order to
once again put them forward, with the necessary adjustments, and fight
via the legislative road or via the carrying out of a new referendum,
alongside fighting in the streets, in the daily struggle, in the class
struggle, so that the social, democratic conquests that were contained
in the proposals of the constitutional reform can be carried out.

We cannot remain with our arms folded; we had the possibility of
approving the six-hour day, are we going to give that away? We had the
possibility to move towards the recuperation of retroactivity of
social security benefits, are we going to give that way? There are the
issues of social security and the pension, the coverage for
non-dependent workers; the protection of families in the face of
possible judicial measures to evict them from their homes; the
possibility of students, together with workers in the universities,
having a vote equal to that of professors, of strengthening the
democratisation of the university and its autonomy. There were grand
conquests in elements of the constitutional reform that had to do with
the new geometry of power and the development of popular power,
communal councils, communes, the self-government of cities. We have to
relaunch all this; this has to be part of our program.

So now it is our turn. It was unsuccessful via the path that was
taken, through the executive and the National Assembly, but I believe
that the social movements have the capacity, if we all come to an
agreement, because it is us who will benefit or lose out, because they
are things we can enjoy or be deprived off. Those are some of the
things that I believe need to be pushed at the congress.

What is the strength of the left inside the PSUV congress? Is its
presence being felt? What about the weight of the UNT?

Gómez: There is a very important layer of delegates closely tied to
the popular movements, who are in tune with the sentiments of the
grassroots, who have a critical stance. It is a critical sector, a
sector that stands firm in the face of corruption and bureaucratism,
that proposes the formation of commissions within the PSUV to review
the situation of high functionaries of public power, of governors,
mayors etc., to make sure we do not have anyone in the party who has
committed acts of corruption, who is implicated in violations of human
rights and are in a position incompatible with the principles of the
party.

For example, a latifundista (large landowner) who owns a large number
of haciendas cannot be a member of the party, much less of its
leadership. On what moral basis can big business owners involved in
large business dealings speak about socialism? What socialism are we
talking about where those that exploit workers in their factory
afterwards talk about socialism in general terms? Is dedicating some
resources towards creating a mirage of workers' participation the
formula for eradicating exploitation, whilst maintaining private
property? Capitalist private property implies exploitation, [the
extraction of] surplus value.

There can agreements made in the economic sphere, in the political
sphere with some of these sectors, but we cannot have the bourgeoisie
in the party, we cannot have the bourgeoisie within the government. We
are talking about giving power to the poor, to the exploited; you do
not give power to the poor by allowing the participation of supposedly
nationalist business sectors in the government. I have never met these
sectors that are consistently anti-imperialist. I would like someone
to name them to me, to talk about their trajectory, to say what it is
that they have done against imperialism, against the exploitation of
[human by human], how they carry out their business; I believe what
they are doing is complying with their role as a class.

Borges: Now, I'm not a delegate, I [missed out] by one vote, but I
have information from comrades that have participated, and they have
been surprised by the enthusiasm of many of the delegates there.
Unfortunately, there is a lot of disorganisation in that has occurred
in the congress. But the determining factor is that there exists an
enthusiasm [among] a large layer of delegates, a big percentage,
almost 40 or 50%, [who] really want to have a party that is capable
leading the revolution.

Regarding the UNT, the UNT is in no way represented at the congress.
As Gonzalo mentioned, one of the errors was the character of enrolling
in the party, where people enrolled to become a militant within a
territorial structure. This has meant that the social movements, as
movements, are not represented in the party as such. Sooner or later
this will have to be corrected. Similarly with the intention from the
start to try and impose the idea that there were not going to be any
currents, tendencies [within the PSUV]. It is inevitable that
different opinions will arise in a process as rich as that in
Venezuela... there are going to be contrary opinions, differences,
criticisms that this situation will not be able to be contain.

This has means that the UNT, or the trade union movement in general,
is not represented... Once there is an opening up within the PSUV of
spaces for the different expressions of the social movements, then the
UNT, all the different currents, will also be expressed there.

What is the importance of the construction of this party, which has
emerged out of a revolutionary process, for the world today?

Gómez: Today, Venezuela is the vanguard of the world revolutionary
movement, or part of it, and it is a very important reference point
for Latin America. Other processes are occurring, such as in Bolivia,
or the process in Ecuador, all these countries that are part of ALBA
[Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas]. I think that there is a lot
of sympathy from left and progressive sectors towards the Venezuelan
process; it is a voice on the international stage that is strongly
taking political ground away from imperialism, constantly denouncing,
pointing out the wrongs; this is something that irritates imperialism.
Much more concrete measures could be taken in the economic terrain,
for example expropriations, or in relation to investments by
transnationals in Venezuela. The political problem is fundamental and
Venezuela has escaped from imperialism's control. It is a country that
has an independent international policy.

Moreover, in defining itself as a party with an internationalist
character and program the PSUV says internationalism does not only
imply establishing ties with movements of other peoples in struggle,
not only implies solidarity, but it also implies the construction of
forms of integration between nations shaking off the yoke of the
transnationals, of imperialism, of neoliberal policies. This points
towards the formation of a international front on the world scale of
the peoples, movements and organisations that are fighting against
imperialism and capitalism.

Borges: As a mentioned before, the PSUV needs to discuss the issue of
how it is going to come together with the other processes in Latin
America, demonstrating the example that Venezuela poses in two ways:
what is beginning done here to resolve the problems of the people, and
providing an example for how to construct a democratic socialist
party, that can act as a reference point for other countries.

How is this resolved concretely? Well, by converting itself into a
democratic and revolutionary party that aids the construction of other
organisations in other countries in order to -- I'm not sure if it
will be a new international, or at least an international coordinating
body -- contribute in some way to the revolutionary process in each
country by setting a good example, and by having the capacity, the
cadres that will be able to help in other countries in the
construction of revolutionary parties. That is what was done during
the Russian Revolution, where cadres went to other countries to help
contribute to other revolutionary processes.

However, the best way the PSUV will be able to aid other processes is
by carrying out concrete action here and deepening the revolution
towards socialism.

Para contactarnos: contacto @ mareasocialista.com | Para el periódico: periodico @ mareasoscialista.com

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